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Three experiments were conducted to find out whether the standard Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) could be used to distinguish truthful and deceitful witnesses. We anticipated that IAT ef-
fects would be greater after lying. Participants were asked to answer questions with incorrect 
answers (i.e., the lie condition) or correct answers (i.e., the truthful condition). A third group 
of participants were not interviewed (a control group). Participants then took the IAT, in which 
they were asked to associate correct and incorrect answers with positive or negative attributes. 
Results demonstrate that standard IAT effects are greater after lying than after truth telling, 
but only when attribute labels were clearly and explicitly linked to positive and negative affect. 
Theoretical implications are considered.
Psychologists have long been interested in whether 
people behave in different ways when they are telling 
a lie and when they are telling the truth. Psychological 
research on cues associated with deception has been 
conducted over several decades. However, research 
on cues to deception has increased in recent years, 
given intense interest in issues of national security 
and terrorism (see DePaulo et al., 2003, for a review of 
the literature on cues to deception). In this article we 
define deception as the act of deliberately providing 
false information. Although some researchers draw 
a distinction between deception and lies (e.g., Bok, 
1978), we use these words interchangeably.
 Although studies on cues to deception have long 
focused on links to deception associated with arousal 
and feelings (DePaulo et al., 2003; Zuckerman, De-
Paulo, & Rosenthal, 1981), many recent studies have 
explored the cognitive aspects of deception (Gregg, 
2007; Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiel-
lo, 2008; Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 
2003). For example, Walczyk et al. (2003) claimed 
that the cognitive process involved in telling lies is 
more complex than that associated with telling truths. 
Reaction times (RTs) associated with open-ended 
questions tended to be longer when telling a lie than 
when telling a truth. Walczyk et al. speculated that the 
longer times associated with lying occurred because 
of the additional cognitive processes associated with 
the decision to lie and the construction of a lie (see 
also Spence et al., 2001).
  Gregg (2007) used another reaction time–based 
lie detection test called the Timed Antagonistic Re-
sponse Alethiometer (TARA). The TARA requires 
the speeded classification of sentences into differ-
ent categories—such as true and false—as accurately 
as possible. Participants who have lied are required 
to perform two  incompatible classification  tasks, 
whereas participants who tell the truth perform two 
compatible classification tasks. As a consequence, 
dishonest respondents were forced to perform more 
slowly than honest respondents in order to achieve 
equivalent levels of accuracy. Gregg found that the 
TARA could distinguish groups of liars and truth 
tellers with 85% accuracy.
 We were interested in whether the Implicit As-
sociation Test (IAT), another cognitive RT paradigm, 
could be used as a tool to distinguish deception from 
truth telling. The IAT is a task, originally developed 
by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998),  in 
which speed of response is intended to assess the 
relative strength with which attitudes are associated 
with positive and negative evaluations. Participants 
classify stimuli representing two target concepts (e.g., 
a lie vs. a truth) and identify attributes as good or bad 
words (e.g., happiness vs. death) by pressing buttons 
on computer keyboard.
  The IAT has traditionally been used to assess im-
plicit racial attitudes. For example, participants might 
see a series of pictures of either African Americans or 
Caucasians, followed by words that are either posi-
tive or negative. Participants must indicate whether 
the word is positive or negative as quickly as pos-
sible. Participants often respond more quickly and 
accurately if good words share the same response key 
with pictures of Caucasian faces and bad words share 
the same key with pictures of African American faces 
than vice versa (Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2000; Greenwald et al., 1998).
  The IAT is based on the assumption that if the 
object of an attitude elicits a particular evaluation, 
whether positive or negative, it will affect RTs to other 
congruent and co-occurring stimuli. RT is used to 
determine the strength of association between some 
object of an attitude and evaluation of that object 
(Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). Several published 
studies confirm the construct and predictive validity 
of the IAT as legitimate measure of implicit attitudes 
(see Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001, for a summary of 
studies on the validity of the IAT).
 Although the IAT was intended to measure at-
titudes or feelings associated with certain people, 
events, or things, some studies have found evidence 
that the IAT might measure other variables. For ex-
ample, Rothermund and Wentura (2004) investigat-
ed whether IAT effects are influenced by salience 
asymmetries rather than associations. They were 
able to demonstrate that IAT effects were dependent 
on salience asymmetries while holding associations 
between categories constant. Although Rothermund 
and Wentura offered a different account of the IAT 
from  that originally posited,  they acknowledged 
that the IAT, as an experimental paradigm, “reveals 
strong, replicable, and nontrivial interference effects” 
(p. 159).
  Although the mechanism behind implicit associa-
tion effects has yet to be fully resolved, some interest-
ing findings have recently appeared in the applica-
tion of the IAT to lie detection. A new method, the 
autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT), 
is used to assess the truthfulness of autobiographical 
statements (Sartori et al., 2008). Participants classify 
sentences seen on a computer screen by pressing one 
of two response keys as quickly as they can in one of 
two tasks. In the confession–true task, confessions 
(e.g., “I have stolen the watch”) and true statements 
are associated with one key, and denial (e.g., “I did 
not steal the watch”) and false statements are associ-
ated with the other key. In the denial–true task, con-
fessions and false statements are associated with one 
key, and denial and true statements are associated 
with the other key. Sartori et al. found that guilty par-
ticipants were faster in the confession–true task than 
in the denial–true task, whereas innocent participants 
showed the opposite results. Sartori found that the 
aIAT could distinguish groups of liars and truth tell-
ers with 91% accuracy (higher than that associated 
with TARA).
 In this study, we wanted to find out whether the 
standard IAT could be used to find out whether par-
ticipants were engaging in deception. Participants 
were asked to answer questions during an interview 
with incorrect answers (the deception condition) 
or correct answers (the truthful condition). Partici-
pants then responded to the IAT. In one block they 
were asked to press one key for correct answers or 
words associated with positive affect and a different 
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key for incorrect answers or words associated with 
negative affect. In another block, participants were 
asked to press one key for correct answers or words 
associated with negative affect and a different key for 
incorrect answers or words associated with positive 
affect. We hypothesized that participants in the de-
ception condition would be slower at following rules 
that paired correct answers with negative affect and 
incorrect answers with positive affect than the reverse 
rule. Theoretically, the association and salience ac-
counts would both be consistent with this predicted 
outcome. If the association account is true, then par-
ticipants in the deceptive condition should be slower 
than participants in the truth condition at associating 
incorrect answers with positive affect because lying 
might elicit more of a negative reaction to this pair-
ing. If the salience account is true, then participants 
in the deception condition should experience more 
of an interference effect because lying might facilitate 
perception of a salience mismatch.
 The goal of this study was to find out whether 
the standard IAT (sIAT) would reveal a greater effect 
after lying than after truth telling. If the hypothesis is 
confirmed, the sIAT could become a new paradigm 
in exploring the cognitive aspects of lying. The results 
of this study could have implications for the theoreti-
cal mechanisms of the IAT.
experiment 1a
Participants in Experiment 1a responded to the IAT, 
in which they were asked to associate deceptive or 
truthful items from the interview with positive or 
negative attributes.
METhOd
Participants
Participants were 51 undergraduate  students  (41 
women and 10 men) from Southern New Hampshire 
University who were recruited on a voluntary basis. 
Participants were from upper- and lower-level psy-
chology classes. Students were offered extra course 
credit for their participation.
Materials
INTERvIEW QUESTIONS
Participants were handed a list of eight questions, 
each followed by a correct and an incorrect answer 
(see Appendix A). All questions were about Southern 
New Hampshire University.
IAT
The IAT is intended to be a test of automatic at-
titudes. The IAT was applied to this study to see 
whether  participants  harbor  a  negative  implicit 
association with items they were asked to use dur-
ing a deceptive task. The eight incorrect and eight 
correct answers were shown during the IAT. The 
evaluative attributes were eight positive (marvelous, 
superb, pleasure, beautiful, joyful, glorious, lovely, 
and wonderful) and eight negative (tragic, horrible, 
agony, painful, terrible, awful, humiliate, and nasty) 
attributes.
  The IAT was administered on Dell XPS 410 desk-
top computers with 20-in. monitors using Windows 
XP operating systems. The software used to admin-
ister the IAT was Inquisit 2.0 by Millisecond.
Procedure
STUdY ANd INTERvIEW PhASE
No more than one participant was administered the 
experiment at a time. Participants entered a room and 
sat in a chair facing the experimenter. Participants first 
engaged in a study phase and then an interview phase, 
each conducted by a different experimenter. During 
the study phase, participants were handed a list of 
eight questions, each with a correct and an incorrect 
answer. They were told to study both the correct and 
incorrect answers. Participants had 4 min to study all 
potential answers but were allowed more time if they 
requested it, with no more than 8 min of total study 
time. Before the study phase started, participants were 
randomly placed in one of three conditions (between 
participants, N = 17 for each condition): no interview, 
truth, and deception conditions. Participants in the no-
interview condition studied the correct and incorrect 
answers but were not interviewed (a control condi-
tion). There were two interview conditions: truth and 
deception. Participants in the truth condition studied 
the correct and incorrect answers during the study 
phase and then answered the eight questions with the 
correct answers orally during a brief interview (a sec-
ond control condition). Participants in the deception 
condition studied the correct and incorrect answers 
during the study phase and then answered the eight 
questions with the incorrect answers orally during a 
brief interview (the treatment condition). The first 
experimenter in the truth condition ended the study 
phase by instructing the participants to tell the truth 
during the interview with the next experimenter. The 
first experimenter in the deception condition ended 
the study phase by instructing participants to provide 
incorrect answers during the interview with the next 
experimenter, even though the second interviewer 
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told them to provide the correct item. Instructions 
regarding the procedure of the experiment found in 
the informed consent also reinforced the idea that par-
ticipants should answer questions during the interview 
with the answers specified by the first experimenter 
(if they should find themselves in one of the interview 
conditions). During the interview, the participant and 
interviewer sat in chairs facing one another with about 
1.22 m between chairs. Interviewers read each question 
from the study phase and made eye contact with the 
participants when they answered the questions.
IAT PhASE
After the interview (or after the study phase in the case 
of participants in the no-interview condition), partici-
pants responded to the IAT on the computer. Partici-
pants viewed the correct and incorrect answers from 
the study phase. In one phase, participants associated 
incorrect items with negative attributes using a certain 
response key (e.g., the “E” key) and correct items with 
positive attributes using a different response key (e.g., 
the “I” key). In another phase participants did the op-
posite; they associated incorrect items with positive at-
tributes using a certain response key and correct items 
with negative attributes using a different response key. 
The phases were counterbalanced so that the order 
of these phases was used equally often with an equal 
number of participants in each sequence of phases. 
The IAT consisted of five separate blocks. See Table 
1 for a description of the blocks and counterbalancing 
schemes. Blocks 1, 2, and 4 included 32 trials. Blocks 
3 and 5 included 96 trials. RTs were measured in mil-
liseconds. A correct or incorrect answer from the study 
phase was shown at the center of the screen, and the 
rules were shown at the top of the screen.
design
The experimental design used was a 3 (type of in-
terview: truth, lie, or no interview) × 2 (IAT combi-
nations: correct information + pleasant vs. incorrect 
information + pleasant)  factorial design. Type of 
interview was varied between participants, and IAT 
combinations were varied within participants.
RESUlTS ANd dIScUSSION
The answers recorded during the two interview con-
ditions were analyzed in order to assess the extent 
to which participants recalled studied items and fol-
lowed directions. Participants in the truth condition 
responded with correct information 93% of the time 
on average (SD = .72). Participants in the deception 
condition responded with incorrect information 90% 
of the time on average (SD = .76).
 IAT data were analyzed using the scoring al-
gorithm, hereafter referred to as D, described by 
Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). The D index 
expresses the IAT effect—the difference in RTs be-
tween the two double-categorization blocks (Blocks 
3 and 5)—relative to the standard deviation of the 
latency measures. More specifically, D is calculated by 
subtracting the corrected mean RT (see Greenwald et 
al., 2003) for Block 3, associating correct and good–
incorrect and bad, from the mean RT for Block 5, 
associating correct and bad–incorrect and good, and 
then dividing this difference by the inclusive standard 
deviation of the two blocks.
 Before calculating D, we discarded RTs shorter 
than 300 ms or longer than 10,000 ms. Latencies were 
log-transformed in order to normalize the distribu-
tion and meet the assumptions for the inferential 
statistics used in this study.
 IAT effects associated with the two answer com-
binations (correct information and pleasant–incorrect 
information and unpleasant vs. incorrect information 
and pleasant–correct information and unpleasant), 
broken down by interview type, are shown in Figure 
table 1. Blocks used for the standard Implicit Association Test
    Block 4: Reversed Block 5: Reversed 
Response Block 1: Accuracy Block 2: Attribute Block 3: Accuracy + accuracy accuracy +  
key discrimination discrimination attribute combined discrimination attribute combined
“E” correct good correct and  Bad correct 
   good  and bad
“I” Incorrect Bad Incorrect  good Incorrect 
   and bad  and good
Note. The orders of Blocks 3 and 5 and of Blocks 2 and 4 were reversed for half the participants.
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1. The IAT effects associated with the interview types 
of deception, truth, and no interview were 399 ms 
(D = .99), 425 ms (D = 1.12), and 378 ms (D = .91), 
respectively. A main effect was observed  for IAT 
combinations, F(1, 48) = 213.06, prep = .96, η2 = .08. 
Interview type and a combination × interview type 
interaction were not significant, Fs < 1.
 Results indicated that participants were faster 
when rules required them to pair correct informa-
tion with “good” words  and  incorrect  informa-
tion with “bad” words than the other way around. 
However, the magnitude of these IAT effects was 
similar in all three conditions (the lie, truth, and 
no-interview conditions).
experiment 1b
In addition to replicating Experiment 1a, Experiment 
1b included a measure of explicit (i.e., self-reported) 
attitudes. Past studies have demonstrated that implic-
it and explicit measures of attitude sometimes differ 
because participants have more time to reflect and 
adjust their answers to explicit reactions (Dasgupta 
& Greenwald, 2001). In addition, we avoided the bias 
that might have been inherent in using the terms in-
correct and correct by referring instead to “Response 
A” and “Response B” items during all phases of the 
experiment. For example, participants in Experiment 
1a might have been slower to respond to incorrect 
items because they were aware that the term incorrect 
has a negative connotation. By referring to the more 
objective terms Response A and Response B on the 
computer screen, and having each represent correct 
items half the time and incorrect items half the time, 
we intended to avoid any negative reactions associ-
ated with the attribute labels.
METhOd
Participants
Fifty-one undergraduate students (39 women and 
12 men) from Southern New Hampshire University 
volunteered for course credit. Participants were from 
lower- and upper-level psychology classes.
Materials, Procedure, and design
With a few exceptions, the number of participants in 
each condition (N = 17), materials, procedure, and 
design were the same as  those  in Experiment 1a. 
Experiment 1b included the following exceptions: 
Correct and incorrect answers were referred to as 
Response A and Response B, respectively, or vice 
versa. Response Set A represented incorrect items 
for half of all participants and correct for the remain-
ing participants. The same was true for Response 
Set B. Response A and Response B were shown in 
place of correct and incorrect answers within the 
IAT. We included “feeling thermometers” as rat-
ings of explicit attitude toward the answers studied 
during the interview (see Dasgupta & Greenwald, 
2001, for more details). Participants placed an X on 
a picture of a thermometer at a point that expressed 
their attitude toward a particular word from the in-
terview, from 0° (cold or unfavorable) to 100° (warm 
or favorable; 50° = neutral). Another procedural dif-
ference was that we asked participants to memorize 
which answers were associated with Response A and 
Response B during the study phase. Participants in 
the truth condition were asked by the first experi-
menter to respond with the same response set as that 
requested during the interview, whereas participants 
in the deception condition were asked by the first 
experimenter to respond with the response set that 
was not requested during the interview.
RESUlTS ANd dIScUSSION
Answers recorded during the interview were ana-
lyzed. Participants in the truth condition answered 
questions with response set items requested during 
figure 1. Effects of interview type on Implicit Association Test 
effects, Experiment 1a
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the interview 92% of the time on average (SD = .68). 
Participants in the deception condition responded 
with response set items not requested during the in-
terview 94% of the time on average (SD = .72).
 IAT data were prepared and transformed in the 
same way as in Experiment 1a (Figure 2). IAT laten-
cies were analyzed using the algorithm by Greenwald 
et al. (2003). IAT effects for the deception, truth, and 
no-interview conditions were 475 ms (D = 1.08), 365 
ms (D = 1.01), and 290 ms (D = .95), respectively. A 
significant main effect was observed for IAT combi-
nations, F(1, 48) = 532.06, prep = .93, η2 = .09. Neither 
a main effect for interview type nor a combination by 
interview type interaction was observed, Fs < 1.
 Explicit measures of attitudes toward answers 
during the interview were measured using feeling 
thermometers. The higher the ratings, the more favor-
able was the participant’s attitude toward the answer. 
When we analyzed incorrect answers only, a difference 
in average ratings was found for type of interview: 
truth (M = 44.20°), lie (M = 32.85°), and no interview 
(M = 49.25°), F(1, 48) = 4.26, prep = .82, η2 = .18. A 
Tukey HSD test indicated that the difference was be-
tween the lie condition and the truth and no-interview 
conditions, prep = .74. An analysis of the correct answers 
revealed no difference between truth (M = 57.03°), lie 
(M = 69.59°), and no-interview (M = 65.16°) conditions, 
F < 1. Participants rated correct answers more favor-
ably (M = 64.69°) than incorrect answers (M = 44.17°), 
t(50) = 6.82, prep = .86, d = .62.
  The results of Experiment 1b replicated the find-
ing that participants are slower responding to rules 
that pair incorrect information with “good” attributes 
than with “bad” attributes. The magnitude of these 
IAT effects toward incorrect information was not 
found to differ significantly between the three types of 
interview conditions (the lie, truth, and no-interview 
conditions). Explicit ratings of attitudes toward in-
correct answers, on the other hand, were affected by 
the type of interview, with ratings indicating that the 
least favorable attitudes were for answers associated 
with the lie condition.
experiment 2
Positive and negative affect associated with correct 
and incorrect information is only one possible ex-
planation for the results of Experiments 1a and 1b. 
The attribute labels good and bad might have been 
ambiguous in these experiments. For example, cor-
rect information might have been perceived as good 
information and incorrect information as bad infor-
mation. As a consequence, good and bad attribute 
labels might not have been associated with negative 
or positive affect. Rather, they would be linked with 
the accuracy of information, an explanation hereafter 
referred to as the accuracy account. In Experiment 
2, we manipulated the attribute labels used. In one 
condition, we used good and bad, as before; in the 
other condition, we used positive affect and negative 
affect.
 We also set up Experiment 2 so that stimuli were 
correct for some participants but incorrect for oth-
ers (using a crime scene description with two dif-
ferent sets of target items). In this way, we were able 
to determine whether the standard IAT is useful in 
assessing the accuracy of eyewitness testimonies and 
distinguishing liars from truth tellers.
METhOd
Participants
The experiment included 108 undergraduate students 
(80 women and 28 men) from Southern New Hamp-
shire University who were recruited on a voluntary 
figure 2. Effects of interview type on Implicit Association Test 
effects, Experiment 1b
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basis. Participants were offered extra course credit for 
upper- and lower-level psychology classes.
Materials
cRIME ScENE dEScRIPTION
Participants were handed paragraphs describing a 
modified version of an actual police confrontation 
that took place in New York City (see Appendix 
B), based on a New York Magazine article (Rovzar, 
2009). Six  items in the description were critical 
items  (italicized  in Appendix B). Notice  that  in 
Appendix B, there are two versions of each of the 
six critical items. One of the versions was associ-
ated with Response A, and the other was associated 
with Response B. Participants were given one sheet 
with “Response A” at the top and another with “Re-
sponse B” at the top. Each sheet showed the same 
crime scene description but with only one version of 
the critical items. Each version of the critical items 
served equally often as Response A and Response 
B items.
IAT
The IAT was administered using the same equipment 
and software as in Experiments 1a and 1b. Response 
A items and Response B items were shown during 
the IAT. The evaluative attributes were six positive 
and six negative attributes randomly sampled from 
Experiment 1a. Half the participants were exposed 
to the “Good” and “Bad” attribute labels, whereas 
the other half were exposed to the “Positive Affect” 
and “Negative Affect” attribute labels.
Procedure
STUdY ANd INTERvIEW PhASE
Participants were asked to study the crime scene 
with Response A critical items and then Response 
B critical items, or vice versa (order of presentation of 
each response set was counterbalanced). Participants 
were told that one of the response sets was correct 
after the study phase was complete. Half of the par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to the Response 
A correct condition, and the remaining participants 
were assigned to the Response B correct condition. 
Participants were told to keep track of which items 
belonged to Response Set A and Response Set B. 
Participants had 5 min to study each response set. 
Participants were placed in one of three conditions 
(between participants, N = 18 for each condition in 
both the “Good” vs. “Bad” and “Positive Affect” vs. 
“Negative Affect” conditions): no-interview, truth, 
and deception conditions. Participants in the no-
interview condition were not interviewed (a control 
condition). There were two interview conditions, 
conducted in the same way as in Experiments 1a and 
1b: the truth and deception conditions. Again, one 
experimenter provided the instructions for the study 
phase, and a different experimenter conducted the 
interview for the truth and deception conditions. The 
first experimenter in the truth condition instructed 
the participant to respond with the response set 
asked for by the interviewer. The first experimenter in 
the deception condition instructed the participant to 
respond with the response set that was not asked for 
by the interviewer (e.g., the first experimenter might 
instruct the participant to respond with Response 
A items, whereas the interviewer asks for Response 
B items).
IAT PhASE
The IAT was run in the same way as in Experiment 
1b, except that half of the participants were randomly 
exposed to the “Good” and “Bad” attribute labels, 
and the other participants saw the “Positive Affect” 
and “Negative Affect” attribute labels.
dESIgN
The experimental design used was a 3 (type of inter-
view: truth, lie, or no interview) × 2 (type of attribute 
label: “Good” and “Bad” or “Positive Affect” and 
“Negative Affect”) × 2 (response type: Response 
Set A correct vs. Response Set B correct) factorial 
design. Type of interview, type of attribute label, and 
response set declared correct were varied between 
participants.
RESUlTS ANd dIScUSSION
As in Experiments 1a and 1b, answers recorded dur-
ing the two interview conditions were analyzed. We 
first analyzed data in the “Good” and “Bad” attri-
bute condition. Participants in the truth condition 
responded with the response set requested by the 
interviewer (i.e., responding with Response Set A 
items in the Response Set A correct condition or 
responding with Response Set B items in the Re-
sponse Set B correct condition) 90% of the time on 
average (SD = .76). Participants in the deception 
condition responded with the response set opposite 
of that requested by the interviewer (responding 
with Response Set B items in the Response Set A 
correct condition or responding with Response Set 
A items in the Response Set B correct condition) 
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88% of the time on average (SD = .80). We then ana-
lyzed interview answers in the “Positive Affect” and 
“Negative Affect” attribute condition. Participants 
in the truth condition responded with response set 
items consistent with that requested by the inter-
viewer 92% of the time on average (SD = .68). Par-
ticipants in the deception condition responded with 
response set items inconsistent with that requested 
by the interviewer (the response set opposite of that 
requested by the interviewer) 89% of the time on 
average (SD = .74).
  We then analyzed the IAT data. RTs shorter than 
300 ms or longer than 10,000 ms were discarded. 
Data are shown in Table 2. Positive D scores indicate 
a faster response when Response A was paired with 
the label “Positive Affect” or “Good” than “Negative 
Affect” or “Bad.” Negative D scores indicate a faster 
response when Response B was paired with the label 
“Positive Affect” or “Good” than “Negative Affect” 
or “Bad.” A hit occurred when a participant had a 
positive D score in the Response A correct condi-
tion or a negative D score in the Response B correct 
condition.
 Across all conditions in Experiment 2, IAT ef-
fects were more positive for the Response A correct 
condition than the Response B correct condition, 
F(1, 102) = 311.21, prep = .93, η2 = .07. A main effect 
for interview type and an interview type × response 
type interaction did not occur, Fs < 1. However, 
there was a significant three-way interaction of in-
terview type × response type × attribute label, F(2, 
102) = 3.02, prep = .97, η2 = .05. The two-way interac-
tion of interview type and response type was signifi-
cant for the “positive affect” versus “negative affect” 
label condition but not for the “Good” versus “Bad” 
label condition, as revealed by Tukey HSD tests.
 These results demonstrate that standard IAT ef-
fects are greater after lying than after truth telling, but 
only when attribute labels are unambiguously linked 
to positive and negative affect. The mere act of lying 
appears to slow down reaction to any rule that re-
quires pairing correct information and positive affect 
or incorrect information and negative affect.
general DisCussion
Taken together, our results indicated that IAT ef-
fects can distinguish correct from incorrect answers. 
Moreover, if the attribute labels are clearly associated 
with positive and negative affect, IAT effects are even 
greater after lying than after truth telling (Experiment 
2). These findings are consistent with other studies, 
which have demonstrated that a similar version of 
the IAT, namely the aIAT, can distinguish deceptive 
witnesses from truthful ones (Sartori et al., 2008; Ver-
schuere, Prati, & De Houwer, 2009). This series of 
experiments extends these findings to reveal that the 
sIAT for correct and incorrect information can also 
distinguish deceptive and truthful witnesses.
 We originally suspected that Experiments 1a and 
table 2. Mean Implicit Association Test effects (ds), reaction times (RTs, in ms), standard deviations, and hit rates by 
type of interview
 Type of interview
 Deception Truth No interview
 D RT (SD) Hit rate (%) D RT (SD) Hit rate (%) D RT (SD) Hit rate (%)
 “Positive Affect” versus “Negative Affect”
Response A correct +.81 517 (.56) 95 +.52 372 (.54) 67 +.50 364 (.47) 63
Response B correct –.88 524 (.51) 92 –.49 369 (.48) 65 –.47 362 (.46) 64
 “Good” versus “Bad”
Response A correct +.54 378 (.61) 70 +.49 359 (.58) 67 +.45 352 (.50) 65
Response B correct –.50 370 (.55) 74 –.52 368 (.46) 73 –.43 349 (.52) 66
Note. Positive d scores indicate a faster response when Response A was paired with the label “Positive Affect” or “good” than “Negative Affect” or “Bad.” 
Negative d scores indicate a faster response when Response B was paired with the label “Positive Affect” or “good” than “Negative Affect” or “Bad.” A hit 
occurred when a participant had a positive d score in the Response A correct condition or a negative d score in the Response B correct condition.
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1b demonstrated that participants held more negative 
attitudes (implicitly) toward incorrect information 
than correct information. The results of Experiment 2 
revealed that the accuracy account—the association of 
the attribute labels “Good” and “Bad” with good and 
bad information rather than good and bad affect—
might explain the results of the first two experiments. 
Once the attribute labels were more explicitly associ-
ated with feelings rather than accuracy, lying led to 
larger IAT effects than telling the truth (or after not 
being interviewed at all). Although this finding is con-
sistent with the affective account, we cannot rule out 
some other potential explanations. For example, the 
results might also reflect greater salience of incorrect 
information after lying and a salience mismatch across 
blocks of the IAT (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). 
Nonetheless, the possibility of strong interference 
effects caused by differences in salience of truthful 
and deceptive information would also be worthy of 
further investigation.
  Even if an affective account is supported by future 
research, further understanding of why a negative im-
plicit attitude toward deceptive information might in-
crease RTs must be explored. As stated earlier, some 
researchers, such as Walczyk et al. (2003), have found 
that RTs when lying tend to be longer than when 
telling the truth. They speculated that this occurs 
because liars must actively inhibit the inclination to 
tell the truth. Spence at al. (2001) found that when 
participants answered questions deceptively, the re-
gions of the brain associated with response inhibition 
(the bilateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices of 
the brain) were more active than when they told the 
truth. It is conceivable that implicit associations for 
lies, and inaccurate information in general, are slower 
than for truths because participants additionally pro-
cess, and perhaps inhibit, thoughts associated with 
the consequences of false information.
  The explicit attitude ratings of Experiment 1b 
indicated a more negative attitude toward incorrect 
information than correct information. Furthermore, 
ratings for answers that were previously associated 
with telling lies were higher than for answers previ-
ously associated with telling the truth. This finding 
is consistent with past research that has revealed at 
least some dissociation between tests of implicit and 
explicit attitudes (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
 Although the construct and predictive validity of 
the IAT are well established for its use in detecting 
implicit racial attitudes in most studies (Dasgupta et 
al., 2000; Greenwald et al., 1998; McConnell & Lei-
bold, 2001, but see Kinoshita & Peek-O’Leary, 2005), 
future research will need to determine the validity of 
applying the IAT to the detection of deceptive and 
false answers. Test administrators would need to 
be particularly careful to prevent malingering when 
applying the IAT to forensic situations. Kim (2003) 
found that when participants are instructed to fake 
their attitudes on the IAT they can do so effectively, 
but only if they are given specific instructions on 
how to do so. Verschuere, Prati, and Houwer (2009) 
showed that, like other lie detection tests, the aIAT 
is vulnerable to faking. They found that participants 
guilty of a mock theft were able to obtain innocent test 
outcomes if they were instructed—and taught how—
to fake. Faking might also affect use of the standard 
IAT for lie detection purposes.
  The sIAT can be a strong indicator of incorrect 
eyewitness accounts, particularly after deception 
has occurred. These findings suggest merely one of 
potentially many ways the IAT can be used when 
detection of malingering is of concern.
APPENdIx A. QUESTIONS
1.  What is the name of the library at Southern New Hamp-
shire University?
 Incorrect Answer: Regina Library
 Correct Answer: Shapiro Library
2.  What appears in the Southern New Hampshire Univer-
sity athletic logo?
 Incorrect Answer: Bear
 Correct Answer: Penman
3.  What is the color of the leather chairs out in the hallways 
and lobbies of Robert Frost Hall?
 Incorrect Answer: Red
 Correct Answer: Tan
4.  The observation room for psychology (in Robert Frost 
Hall) is located where?
 Incorrect Answer: First floor, Walker Auditorium
 Correct Answer: Third floor, RF315
5.  In what city is Southern New Hampshire University lo-
cated?
 Incorrect Answer: Houston
 Correct Answer: Manchester
6.  In which month does school begin at Southern New 
Hampshire University?
 Incorrect Answer: August
 Correct Answer: September
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7.  What are the school colors of Southern New Hampshire 
University?
 Incorrect Answer: Green and gold
 Correct Answer: Blue and yellow
8.  What brand of computers is used in the first floor lab in 
Robert Frost Hall?
 Incorrect Answer: Macintosh
 Correct Answer: Dell
APPENdIx B. cRIME ScENE dEScRIPTION, ExPERIMENT 2
Yesterday a man was handcuffed [in Times Square/outside 
of Yankee Stadium] for wandering around in a [Superman/
Batman] costume. Police approached [Maksim “Clark Kent” 
Katsnelso/Frank “Bruce Wayne” Frisoli] and asked him if he 
had “the required license to perform in costume in public.” 
When he said he didn’t, the police tried to [taser/handcuff] 
him. A witness claimed that it took [2 officers/8 officers] to 
hold down the “super hero.” He was putting up a good 
fight. A child at the scene said, “Mommy, it’s [Superman/
Batman]!” Eventually, he allegedly [punched a female cop/
punched a male cop] in the face and was taken to the station 
for assault and resisting arrest.
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